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ABSTRACT (max 150 words)  
 
Crises could be understood as dislocations of hegemonic identity narratives. One strategy of seeking 
ontological security, as re-ordering process to calm and sooth these displacements, is ‘defending 
memory’. But how does ‘defending memory’ play out? This article argues that to understand those 
mnemonic processes, one also has to look at the affective investments into these identity narratives 
informing processes of politicisation and securitisation. The article proposes to look at those process-
es through the lens of affective geopolitics to shed light onto those in the South Caucasus. In so do-
ing, it explores the affective reproduction of memory and shows how investing, subscribing, question-
ing or rejecting identity-positionalities is a patch-work process of discursive emotion norm contesta-
tions. What emerges is a mosaic of emotion cultures drifting apart (between the South Caucasus 
countries) and away (internationally) linked to how ‘the past’ is re-felt either in agony or in glori-
ousness within presidential discourses. 
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1. Of Crisis and Trauma 
‘Memory continues to be so deeply troubled—ignored, appropriated, and obfuscat-
ed—throughout Eastern Europe.’ (Subotić 2019c:summary) 
These memory troubles, Subotić further argues, could be observed as part 
of the Eastern European countries’ accession to the European Union during which 
these states were required to adopt, participate in, and contribute to the established 
Western narratives of - and feelings towards - the Holocaust in their attempts to 
seek ontological security (OSS). In line with Krastev and Holmes’s (2019) reasoning 
she implicitly draws on the language of emotions in arguing that this requirement 
created anxiety and resentment in those post-communist states shifting the atten-
tion of whom was legitimate to suffer by the hands of whom from communist ter-
ror to predominantly Jewish suffering in World War II1.  
This article illustrates that reconciling, accommodating, challenging or re-
jecting those memories is an act of affectively seeking ontological security - that is 
that discursive strategies to console mnemonic security imaginaries not only rely on 
narrative creativity but on their emotional fit and value. The article thus not only 
highlights the narrative processes presented by Subotić, but shows the underlying 
emotional recalibrations, drifts and rifts as additional discursive layer of remember-
ing2.  
Moreover, it sheds light onto a subject which has been relatively sidelined in the 
study of the South Caucasus where studies on nationalism, protracted conflict, and 
security have dominated the scholarly debate3. It is only within more recent devel-
opments that attention was drawn to the study of identity politics4. In turn, histori-
 
1
 See also Gustafsson (2014) for an account of how memory politics are intertwined with ontological 
security. 
2 See Rauf & Rena (2011) or Ziemer (2018) for some general explorations. 
3 See Rich (2013), Hayoz & Dafflon (2014), Geukjian (2016). 
4 Particularly two conferences spring to mind here: The Heinrich Boell Foundation et al.’s (2019) 
‘South Caucasus Regional Conference on Memory Politics’ and the Academic Swiss Caucasus Net et 
al.’s (2016) conference on ‘Memory and Identity in Post-Soviet Space. Georgia and the Caucasus in a 
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ography presented as ‘neutral description’ of history has itself seen attention within 
the outlined memory politics to justify either Armenia’s, Azerbaijan’s or Georgia’s 
interpretation of subjectively appropriate political remembrance and claims to polit-
ical authority and sovereignty5. 
On the occasion of the three South Caucasus states’ (Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia) three simultaneous anniversaries in 2018/2019 that have shaped their bi-
ographies - and interpretations of victimhood (Lim 2020) -, this article therefore 
takes a look at today’s contested identity imaginations there. In so doing, it takes 
these biography-shaping events as critical junctures within their discursive canvases 
that construct those ontological narrations in the first place.  
These crises, as Leek & Morozov (2018) state, could be understood as dis-
locations of hegemonic/ privileged identity narratives (Nabers 2015). As brought 
forward within this special issue, one strategy of seeking ontological security as re-
ordering process to calm and sooth these displacements is ‘defending memory’ 
(Mälksoo 2015). But how does ‘defending memory’ play out? This paper argues that 
to understand those mnemonic processes, one also has to look at the affective in-
vestments into these identity narratives as emotional canvases for processes of poli-
ticisation and securitisation.  
Thus - in light of the narrative and affective turns in IR - this article high-
lights the specific role of emotions in shaping those ontological security (OS) ra-
tionales and how this has affected change and continuity in renegotiating their iden-
tity imaginaries (Browning & Christou 2010; Browning 2015, 2018c; Browning & 
 
Broader Eastern European Context’. See also Grigoryan & Margaryan (2018), Gugushvili, 
Kabachnik & Kirvalidze (2017), Chikovani (2009), Huseynova (2019), Grant (2009), and Yalçın-
Heckmann (2016). 
5Amongst others see Suny (2004) and de Waal (2019) for an historic overview. Moreover: 
Agadjanian, Jödicke, & van der Zweerde (2017), Richardson (2010), Cheterian (2008), Dawisha & 
Parrott (1997), Hille (2010), Oskanian (2013), Eldar & Rauf (2007), Companjen, Marácz, & 
Versteegh (2010), Kitaevich (2014), and Bursulaia (2020). 
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Joenniemi 2016). In so doing, it draws particular attention to the affective reproduc-
tion of memory and shows how investing, subscribing, questioning or rejecting 
identity-positionalities is a patch-work process of discursive emotion norm contes-
tations resulting in traumatic or nostalgic representations of the past (Resende & 
Budryte 2014).  
2018/19’s triple anniversary character underscores the significance of 
those three pasts within Armenia’s, Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s presidential dis-
courses by highlighting the contested nature of their remembrance (Kurilla 2009; 
Shevel 2011; Bernhard & Kubik 2014; Subotić 2019a; Lim 2020; Yemelianova & 
Broers 2020). 
One, 100 years after their independence from the Russian Empire and 
formation as independent republics - and thus the re-emergence of independent but 
contested state biographies located in a volatile ‘in-between’ of varying, overlapping, 
clashing and political power claiming empires throughout history (Coppieters 2004; 
Rayfield 2012; Torbakov & Plokhy 2018; de Waal 2019).  
Two, 30 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War 
- and thus the end of Soviet rule there and their eventual republican independence 
from the Soviet Union. This furthermore marks the secession wars around Na-
gorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan.  
Particularly the break-up of the Soviet Union – for some the hope- and 
joyful end of history, for some the greatest tragedy in modern history – and the re-
sultant independencies of the three Caucasus countries are focal points within the 
affective OS politics of remembering the past. In this regard, 30 years afterwards 
the euphoria6 of the victory of liberal reason against illiberal oppression has given 
 
6 See, for example, Fukuyama’s (2006) infamous ‘The End of History’. However, this was also re-
flected in an abundance of scholarship on the absolute efficiency and prevalence of (neo)liberal de-
mocracy as economic and political governance model after 1989 which was celebrated and justified 
post-hoc with a litany of relative attractiveness arguments (in comparative transition research) and 
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way to a resurgence of pessimism and frustration (not only) in the countries which 
escaped the Iron Curtain. What is more, the hope and optimism in reconciling EU-
Russia relations and thus in finding a place (DeBardeleben 2008) for the Central and 
Eastern European and South Caucasus states - as ‘newly independent’ neighbours - 
in-between the EU and Russia has vanished7. Moreover, the emergent debates and 
dynamics around a ‘new Cold War’, that is the contestation of the form and sub-
stance of global order supposedly between ‘a declining West’ and an ‘emergent East’ 
with the fault line to be found in this ‘grey zone’, have, increasingly so, included the 
South Caucasus as an area of contestation of ideas of bipolar or multipolar orders 
amid discourses of multi-order configurations (Bassin et al. 2015; Giragosian 2015; 
Besier & Stokłosa 2016; Golunov 2017).  
Three, 10 years of the EU’s Eastern Partnership Initiative mark the institu-
tionalisation of neighbourhood relationships in-between the EU and Russia. The 
extension of this towards the three South Caucasus states mirrors the just men-
tioned hopes and disappointments. Furthermore, this both marks the 2008 Russo-
Georgian 5-Days War and, at the half-way of this timeframe, the 2014 Ukraine Cri-
sis as major reverberations in this neighbourhood. This volatile area ‘in-between’ 
the EU and Russia, the Middle East and Central Asia is an intriguing playing field of 
a variety of actors with often paradoxical agglomerations of interests and values 
projected through various means. Amongst others, these means include energy links 
and economic dependencies, passportisation and the stealth moving of fences, the 
support of de-facto states, and various modus operandi of militaries (bases, coop-
 
‘the victory of reason’. To this day, this line of thought finds some devotees, particularly in the neo-
realist and neoliberal traditions (see Mousseau 2019).  
7 This affective travel is best represented in relation to footnote one, e.g. Fukuyama’s (2018) new - 
and opposing - appraisal and interpretation of reality as marked by the politics of resentment - 
through the acclamation of mobilised and exploited identity politics as source and resource of chal-
lenging (liberal) order(s). 
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eration, missions, observations, peace-keeping) as well as the manipulation of public 
discourses via disinformation (Boyle 2016; Galeotti 2019; Toal & Merabishvili 
2019). Moreover, the South Caucasus states find themselves in the vicinity - or pe-
riphery - of at least two integration projects (EEU/EU) and potentially overlapping 
security architectures (NATO/CSTO) (Toal 2016; Buzogány 2019). Conflicting 
claims to territory and sovereignty mark not-so-frozen conflicts around Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia between Georgia and Russia and Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The five days war in 2008 between Georgia and 
Russia and the highly volatile conflict around Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh, expres-
sively marked by cycles of violence, highlight the intensity of these identity politics 
where (political) belonging is translated through militarised foreign and security 
policies (Aydın 2011; Altunışık & Tanrisever 2018; Averre and Oskanian 2019). 
These outlined three anniversaries can be understood as social markers of 
history where the abovementioned hegemonic OS narratives were dislocated in a 
variety of circumstances. Defending a certain version of those events thus becomes 
a strategy of ontological security seeking, i.e. of recalibrating narrative landscapes to 
cope with the negatively felt disorientation - a critical juncture - ontological insecu-
rity brings with it.  
As such, this article argues that to uphold a positive self-identity, or (state) 
auto-biography, in form of positive narratives – seeking ontological security – is in-
tricately linked to memory politics (Mitzen 2006; Rumelili 2015a, 2015b, 2018; 
Mitzen and Larson 2017; Subotić 2018, 2019a, 2019b). However, to make sense of 
those dynamics it draws attention to the affective reproduction of memory and the 
construction and contestation of (event) related feeling rules highlighting how ‘the 
past’ is re-felt either in agony or in gloriousness. Thus, ‘Coming in from the Cold 
[War]’ (Ross 2006) fittingly represents - both literally and figuratively - this line of 
thought where illuminating the affective underpinnings of OS theory lets us under-
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stand the outlined memory dynamics as affective instances of seeking and uphold-
ing ontological security. 
 
2. Affective Ontological Security Seeking and Memory Politics 
To this effect, this article suggests to re-discover and re-interpret Gid-
dens’s (1991) work on OS theory to recalibrate our understanding of OSS through 
an affective lens. Subsequently, it posits that the need to uphold a positive self-
identity (auto-biography) - in form of positive narratives and positive self-affect - 
drives those affective memory politics where the need for creating or continuing 
this double positivity trumps physical security. This is denoted as affective ontologi-
cal security seeking8 in the following. 
In so arguing, this research conceives of those geographies of contested 
memories as boundaries of identities and emotions - demarcations of ‘good and 
evil’ (Lauritzen et al. 2011; Rumelili 2016; Koschut 2017a). This means that these 
narrated ontologies are interwoven with emotions, for example, fear, anxiety and 
hate, or friendship, trust and hope (Kinnvall 2016; Browning 2018a, 2018b; Kinn-
vall et al. 2018; Kinnvall & Mitzen 2018) either supporting or questioning and re-
jecting claims to ‘truthful’ history and ontological being throughout it.  
The volatile research field of OS studies has encountered several critical de-
bates over time: whereas the initial state-centred approach has given way to a multi-
faceted one embracing the multiplicity of identity/boundary discourses and the in-
 
8 ‘Affect’ was chosen here to denominate this cycle since Giddens speaks of ‘emotional and behav-
ioural ‘formulae’ which have come to be part of their everyday behaviour and thought’ (1991: 24) 
regulating this OSS. As such, these formulae are embedded, generalised emotional scripts or norms 
relatively automatically - subconsciously - applied. This meaning of ‘automatism’ of emotional re-
calibrations is carried by ‘affect’ as implicit (‘instinctive’) need within OSS and reflects the central 
role of emotions in the everyday (identity struggle discourses). However, these dynamics are subse-
quently not interpreted in terms of embodied affect here, but in terms of collective identity forma-
tion dynamics in line with Koschut and Wodak (see further on pages 11f.). 
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stability and fragility inherent to those ontics implicated with power and status dy-
namics9, ‘the inefficient causation of [OSS]’ (Mälksoo 2018) and the ‘too elastic 
definition of crisis in OS’ (Ejdus 2017, 2019) remain problematisations at the heart 
of OS theory’s epistemology and ontology (Chernobrov 2019; Steele & Homolar 
2019).  
What runs like a common thread through OS theory literature, further-
more, is that in a keen manner it has jumped towards the language of emotions10 - 
particularly anxiety as coined in Laing’s (1968, 1969, 1991) and later Giddens’s 
(1991) original works on OS - but has so far discredited or under-conceptualised 
their role within, where most understandings were limited to rather essentialist read-
ings of anxiety/fear as either ex-ante or ex-post condition of in/security struggles, 
or conflations within only paying lip service to ‘emotions’ (Crawford 2019).  
However, in Giddens’s initial definition, ontological in/security as the dis-
ruption of self-narratives11 is directly linked to emotions, explicitly shame as nega-
tive emotion: ‘In order to be able to ‘go on’ an agent has to be able to tell a rea-
sonably consistent story about where it came from and where it is going; it has to 
 
9 ‘[…] calls for a more open understanding that: (i) links ontological security to reflexivity and avoids 
collapsing together the concepts of self, identity and ontological security; (ii) avoids privileging secu-
ritization over desecuritisation as a means for generating ontological security; and (iii) opens out the 
concept beyond a narrow concern with questions of conflict and the conduct of violence more to-
wards the theorization of positive change.’ (Browning & Joenniemi 2016; also Croft & Vaughan-
Williams 2016) ‘Ontics’ are here understood as the abundance of all contested narrative construc-
tions and processes within the OS space – inherently unstable and requiring maintenance, especially 
during periods of crisis or transition (cf. Ejdus 2019). 
10 For example, Mälksoo's (2019) article draws on the language of emotions (‘doubts’ about the EU’s 
efficacy and ‘concerns’ about the EU’s resolution in face of rising populism), but leaves it at that. 
The same applies to Subotić’s (2013a) ‘a sense of routine, familiarity, and calm.’ However, one has to 
acknowledge, amongst others, the recent contributions by Browning (2018a&b) and Kinnvall (2016) 
embracing the intricate nature of emotions within ontological security phenomena.  
11 ‘A reasonably consistent story with bearing’ implies a multitude of narratives making up the ontic 
space -given that a story is normally made up of different single narratives casting different angles 
and details, e.g. an assemblage of various narratives within and across (ontological security) imagi-
naries. 
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have a certain bearing. When this is not the case, the agent experiences shame.’ 
(Giddens in Steele 2008: 1). 
What is more, for him these crises are not only challenges to those self-
understandings leading to shame, if successful, but to emotional disorientation. 
Most prominently, he mentions anxiety: 
‘[t]his cognitive and emotional disorientation – fragility - leads to ‘flooding 
in anxiety’12 (Giddens 1991:37). 
One should note that this emotional disorientation during and after crises 
is - in the words borrowed and adapted from Leek & Morozov (2018) - a disloca-
tion of emotions which were present before: in a turn to the negative. Insofar, criti-
cal junctures shall be understood as the dislocation of dominant emotions linked to 
OS narratives. 
But what is more, in contrast to the preoccupancy with ‘existential anxiety’, 
Giddens sketches more specific emotions as relevant against the backdrop of this 
anxiety: namely shame and guilt (Giddens 1991:65) - as well as trust, confidence and 
pride. In so doing, he also specifies the strategies with which these are provoked 
and felt13, namely humiliation and situations in which feelings of inadequacy are elic-
ited14. Moreover, if reality is understood through this affective lens, ‘social manage-
 
12 Giddens (1991:44) specifically differentiates between anxiety and fear: ‘Anxiety is essentially fear 
which has lost its object through unconsciously formed emotive tensions that express ‘internal dan-
gers’ rather than externalised threats. We should understand anxiety essentially as an unconsciously 
organised state of fear. Anxious feelings can to some degree be experienced consciously, but a per-
son who says ‘I feel anxious’ is normally also aware of what he or she is anxious about. This situation 
is specifically different from the ‘free-floating’ character of anxiety on the level of the unconscious.’ 
13 This is congruent with a definition of ‚mobilisation of emotions in discourse‘, e.g. the hereunder 
used terminology of emotionalisations.  
14 ‘[…B]ypassed shame links directly to feelings of ontological insecurity: it consists of repressed 
fears that the narrative of self-identity cannot withstand engulfing pressures on its coherence or so-
cial acceptability. Shame eats at the roots of trust more corrosively than guilt. […] Shame and trust 
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ment strategies/routines/mechanisms’ of anxiety or other emotions are open to in-
clude a litany of different emotionalisations15. Consequently - given the aforemen-
tioned affective conditions of OS(S) - in addition to up-holding just a positive self-
narrative there’s also a need of balancing (narrations of) emotions linked to this 
identity16.  
 
 
Figure 1. Two mutually constitutive Domains of affective OSS.  
 
Source: Author’s own visualisation of elaborated theoretical framework. 
 
Like for identity research, the vocabulary to denote is plentiful - affect, 
sentiment, attunement, and feeling, amongst others - referring to different concep-
 
are very closely bound up with one another, since an experience of shame may threaten or destroy 
trust’ (Giddens 1991:66). 
15 ‘Since anxiety, trust and everyday routines of social interaction are so closely bound up with one 
another, we can readily understand the rituals of day-to-day life as coping mechanisms. This state-
ment does not mean that such rituals should be interpreted in functional terms, as means of anxiety 
reduction (and therefore of social integration), but that they are bound up with how anxiety is social-
ly managed.’ (Giddens 1991: 46) 
16 Elemental to this understanding is to re-assess critical junctures - ontological insecurities - as re-
inspections and points of departure for recalibrations of emotions (and their representations). This is 
in line with Laing’s (1960, 1961, 1968) foundational thoughts on OS where expressed feelings are 
taken as explicit impressions of subjective experience. 
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tualizations of emotions17. What they all have in common, however, is that they 
tackle the ‘politics of anxiety’ (Eklundh et al. 2017) from varying angles. In this re-
gard, Koschut et al.’s (2017), Clément and Sangar’s (2018), and van Rythoven and 
Sucharov's (2019) edited volumes provide an excellent overview of the richness and 
diversity of this volatile field18.  
Relevant to this article’s approach, the emerging discourse-emotion nexus 
in IR seeks to systematically integrate emotions within discourse analysis and to 
highlight the power of language in conveying emotional meaning (Hutchinson 2010, 
2016; Solomon 2012, 2013, 2018; Edkins 2013; Ross 2013; Koschut 2014, 2017b, 
2017c, 2018, 2019; Åhäll & Gregory 2015; Fierke 2015; van Rythoven 2015, 2018; 
Bleiker & Hutchinson 2018). As such, emotion discourse refers to the assumption 
that discourses have affective content and that emotions can be studied via speech 
acts.  
Koschut (2014, 2017a,b,c, 2018, 2019), for example, highlights the rela-
tionship between emotion and culture by investigating the affective reproduction of 
culture in world politics. The most significant term coined by this contribution is 
 
17 Affect is broadly understood as ‘the bodily experience of emotion’ (Fierke 2014), or as the inner 
(embodied) disposition of emotions - as biological, physiological, instinctive process of appraisal 
(Åhäll 2018). ‘In other words, whereas emotion might capture the conscuous throught, subjective 
experiences and normative judgements […], affect refers to a completely different order of activity 
where affect can be understood as a ‚set of embodied practices‘ or as a form of ‚indirect and non-
reflective‘ thinking that never quite rises to the level of an emotion‘ (Thrift 2008: 175). 
18 In this ambition, Åhäll (2018) fits into a recent surge to make sense of emotions in IR engaged in 
highlighting the multiplicity and diversity in theoretically interpreting and methodologically grasping 
emotions (Crawford 2000; Crawford and Hutchinson 2016). Approaches vary according to the onto-
logical (emotions in/of the body, individual, collective, social discourse?), epistemological (emotions 
as rituals, practices, norms, (re-)actions within or in-between the micro or macro level?) and analyti-
cal (consequences of emotions on behaviour/empirical phenomena, rationality and instrumentality 
of emotions, bodily effects by and of emotions?) status of emotions in the chosen research, opening 
up a vast space of literature discussion those phenomena (Demertzis 2013; Reus-Smit 2014; Ekman 
and Davidson 2015; Mordka 2016; Boddice 2018; Prior & van Hoef 2018; Agathangelou 2019; 
Crawford 2019; Schick 2019). 
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the introduction of the complex of an ‘emotion culture’ which Koschut understands 
as a culture-specific complex of emotion vocabularies, feeling rules and beliefs 
about emotions and their appropriate expression that facilitates the cultural con-
struction of political communities and identity. These (political) communities imag-
ined through emotional representations draw our attention to the affective invest-
ments (Solomon 2013; Chatterje-Doody & Crilley 2019) sustaining and challenging 
those communities as foundations of belonging and alterity - of affective boundary 
drawings in general. Koschut terms them ‘emotio(nal) communities’ – ‘groups in 
which people adhere to the same norms of emotional expression and value – or de-
value – the same or related emotions’ (Rosenwein 2006:2). 
As such, affective investments correspond to the vocabulary Giddens 
(1991) uses when outlining the conditions for the in/stability of OS rationales, 
namely sufficient emotional commitment. Specifically, he understands trust, hope 
and courage as relevant commitments in this context, meaning that these emotional 
representations of OS narratives sustain those against challenges. In this regard, 
introducing affective investments as theoretical understanding of the emotional 
commitment to OS narratives draws on the same logic as denominating the outlined 
OSS logics ‚affective OSS‘, i.e. that ‘affect as an experience […] lies beyond the 
realm of discourse, yet nevertheless has an effect upon discourse‘ (Solomon 
2013:907). It thus underlines the ‘emotional and behavioural ‘formulae’ which have 
come to be part of their everyday behaviour and thought‘ (Giddens 1991:24) 
regulating this OSS. This meaning of ‘automatism’ of emotional re-calibrations is 
carried by ‘affect’ as implicit (‚instinctive‘) need within OSS and reflects the central 
role of emotional commitments in the everyday identity struggles.  
As such, emotion communities can also be considered as imagined com-
munities, and going back to Giddens’s interpretations of the role of emotions, as 
security communities where security would then be ontological security.  
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Koschut furthermore argues that ‘emotion norms – the expression of appropriate 
emotions in a given situation – stabilise a security community’.  
This emotional code of an emotional culture prescribes what is regarded as 
an appropriate emotional performance (and what is not) within a particular group, 
thereby reproducing its collective identity and power structure (Koschut 2017). Fre-
quent occurrences of emotional states linked to particular group identities build up 
associations of specific emotions with particular identities and lead to the display of 
relatively stable emotional profiles, such as an association of a national identity with 
pride or an identity as a member of a conflictual group with anger19. 
In this context, Koschut goes on to argue that emotional representations 
and emotionalisations are the discursive containers graspable in discourse, namely 
the attachment of emotional meaning to narratives and the mobilisation of emo-
tions in discourse as the practice, performance or ritual to give something an emo-
tional quality or to make an emotional display in discourse (Wodak and Schulz 
1986; Wodak and Meyer 2009; Wodak 2015; Koschut et al. 2017; Koschut 2017b, 
2017c; ). Consequently, affective dynamics are here understood in Koschut’s and 
Wodak’s discursive understanding.  
 
 
 
 
19 ‘It is argued that emotions provide a socio-psychological mechanism by which culture moves indi-
viduals to defend a nation-state, especially in times of war. By emotionally investing in the cultural 
structure of a nation-state, the individual aligns him/herself with a powerful cultural script, which 
then dominates over other available scripts.’ 
See also Fierke (2015): ‘[narratives] acquire emotional resonance within social, cultural and/or politi-
cal context. We are socialized to experience the emotions of fear, revulsion or horror that accompa-
ny memories of past wars, among others.’ This resonates with Giddens’s standpoint that identity re-
lations are constituted emotionally first and foremost and that the being comes into the world by ac-
knowledging trust relations. 
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3. Studying Affective Memory Politics 
According to Toal (2018:1) ‘affective geopolitics is the study of the power-
ful forces of emotion, the experience of being outraged, the desire to condemn, to 
abhor the behaviour of another state’ (see also Moïsi 2010 and Gökarıksel & Secor 
2018). As such, he is interested in the role of ‘shock events’ in international relations 
and how they disturb international order and how these events can, and have, de-
fined community and belonging. In this regard, Toal (2018) understands these affec-
tive geopolitics as amalgamation of ‘a leader’s affective dispositions’, ‘affective 
storylines’ and ‘state-sponsored mobilizations’ as well as ‘geopolitical culture’ and 
proposes to study them through a combination of thick description, critical dis-
course-emotion analysis, power structure analysis and survey research20.  
What this article lays out is an understanding of these affective geopolitics 
through readings of OS theory to substantiate what Toal (2018) calls ‘shock events’ 
as critical junctures related to felt ontological insecurities, and to shed light onto 
constructions of ‘the past’ through the dynamics of emotion communities within 
the logics of affective ontological security seeking.  
As outlined in the introduction, 2018/19’s particular triple anniversary and 
victimhood character for the three South Caucasus states provides a peculiar entry 
frame into the affective contestations of ‘the pasts’. The chosen comparative design 
allows exploring those contested affective memories from different discursive an-
gles and highlights the varying affective interpretations and consequences of those 
events. Accordingly, the timeframe under scrutiny was chosen to account for and 
trace the discursive dynamics since the last major anniversary marker in 2008/9 up 
until the most recent feasible present in 2018. This accounts for a one-year buffer to 
 
20 Nevertheless, this is a relatively thin definition and understanding of what these affective geopoli-
tics are and how they shape identity constellations given that he doesn’t delineate the co-constitutive 
relationships of those aspects/dimensions (Reeves 2011; Gökarıksel & Secor 2018; Laszczkowski & 
Reeves 2018). 
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consider a closed corpus at the time of writing this article. This timeframe allows, 
first, to discern larger trends in the presence, production and rejection of affective 
OS narratives, second, to identify and qualify these potential changes, variations and 
adaptions, and third, to map emotional landscapes and affect through various con-
texts or discursive categories. 
Here, what Toal (2018) calls ‘a leader’s affective dispositions’ serves as en-
try point to the presidential mnemonic processes - under scrutiny via a leadership 
trait analysis; what he calls ‘affective storylines’ is re-interpreted as assemblage of 
narrative and affective landscapes - under scrutiny via an emotion discourse analy-
sis; and what he calls ‘state-sponsored mobilizations’ is translated into presidential 
emotionalisations as the practice, performance or ritual to give something - here the 
remembrance of the past - an emotional quality or to make an emotional display - 
also under scrutiny via an emotion discourse analysis. 
Presidential speech acts as practice of affective storylines thus constitute 
and contest, tap into or reject emotion norms as function of upholding ontological 
security along self-gratification or other-rejection motives. 
In synthesis of the above, this work argues that one should focus on emo-
tional representations rather than on emotion itself, circumventing the otherwise in-
evitable epistemic and ontological pitfalls such as individual affective phenomenol-
ogy or personification of states to trace those OSS dynamics as argued by Koschut 
(2017b/c, 2018) or Wodak (2009). Therefore, the following methods were applied: 
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Table 1 - Overview of Methods 
What? How? How so? Of whom? 
Analytical Focus Method Instrumental Steps 
of Method 
Corpus Con-
struction 
- Cognitive drives for 
behaviour: need for af-
filiation, achievement, 
power, reward, risk21 
- temporal orientation 
of presidential dis-
courses: past, present, 
future  
Leadership Trait  
Analysis (LTA) 
through an 
automated 
cognitive lin-
guist analysis 
(ACLA) 
1. LIWC 2015 pro-
vides a dictionary cov-
ering about 4,500 
words and word stems 
from > 70 categories. 
2. Automated analysis 
of pre-given measure-
ment categories for 
cognitive drives and 
temporal orientations 
based on programme 
dictionary. 
Presidential 
Discourses in 
Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, 
Georgia from 
2008-2018a  
 
 
- Imaginaries of  
ontological security 
narratives and identity 
constructions and their 
emotional representa-
tions and respective 
emotionalisations 
 
 
Emotion  
Discourse  
Analysis 
 (EDA) 
Three-step inductive 
coding: 
1. sensitive exploratory 
reading of the text 
sample  
2. Structured coding 
and classification: 
emotion categories 
and locus (self/other), 
context, emotionalisa-
tions 
3. Refinement and 
specifications and 
cross-check 
aSample: all interviews, messages, speeches and statements of the respective heads of state (presi-
dents) as published on their official webpage (English version) as data entry points from 2008 to 
2018. Armenia: in total: 433; transcribed 9; translated 4; missing: 1 (2009), 2 (2017). Azer-
baijan: in total: 153; transcribed 11; translated 0; missing 1 (2010), 2 (2011), 2 (2013), 2 
(2015),1 (2016), 1 (2017). Georgia: in total: 515; transcribed 12; translated 4; missing: 0. 
Government tenure: Saakashvili 2008-2013 (in total 309); Margvelashvili 2013-2018 (in total: 
206). Based on http://www.president.am, https://en.president.az, 
http://www.saakashviliarchive.info, https://www.president.gov.ge. 
Source: author’s own elaboration on method and sample (see above).  
 
21
 Tausczik & Pennebaker 2010. 
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Emotion discourse analysis is concerned with how actors - here the heads 
of state of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia - talk about emotions and how they 
employ emotion categories when talking about subjects, events, or social relations. 
Theoretically, such an understanding views emotions as socially constructed repre-
sentations of meaning that are linked to conceptions of identity and power 
(Koschut in Clément & Sangar 2018: 277ff.). While emotions are, indeed, fluid and 
shifting, EDA argues that they also display a high degree of attachment and entan-
glement resulting in relatively stable patterns of emotional meanings and webs of 
interconnections which can be traced and analysed (Koschut in Clément & Sangar 
2018: 297ff.). This approach was chosen because it suggests a remedy to the prob-
lem of the subjective ontology of emotions by shifting the analytical focus from 
their individual internal phenomenological perception and appraisal to their inter-
subjective articulation and communication in discourse so that one is able to study 
emotions as intersubjective representations (Capelos & Chrona 2018).  
Within this emotion discourse analysis, a special focus lies on the (onto-
logical security) narratives the presidents employ, that is, what stories they create 
and instrumentalise to interpret social reality in the context of specific social, his-
torical and cultural locations (Somers 1994: 606). Here, the strategic use of narra-
tives is considered as a strategy to promote a particular interpretation of a given is-
sue for understanding both the past and the present in a simplified, schematic, and 
linear fashion - as ‘cognitive molds’ (Subotić 2013b, 2016) representing the causal 
fabric of experience (Goffman 1974)22.  
 
22
 Like Subotić (2016), it seems fruitful to look at those narratives in a more intertextual manner via 
‘schematic narrative templates’ (Wertsch 2008) - narratives of general patterns across space and time, 
reflecting a single general story line - instead of focusing on specific narratives of individualities. 
They are particularly prone to an ‘instrumentalisation of narratives’: their (state) control, production, 
and consumption, here through the presidents as collective identity entrepreneurs (Subotić 2016; van 
Hoef 2018). 
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The Leadership Trait Analysis sheds light onto the cognitive drives for be-
haviour (need for affiliation, achievement, power, reward, risk) and the temporal 
orientation of the presidential discourses (past, present, future).  
These cognitive linguistic traits show how frequent specific motivations 
for behaviour were articulated in discourses and which temporal focus speeches 
had. This lets us discover both articulated underlying motivations and temporal ori-
entations in presidential reasonings. It distinguishes between the motivations for af-
filiation - the need of belonging to or identification with something (may it be an 
elite/ party/ country/ international alliance), for achievement - the need of signal-
ling success and wanting to ‘continue winning’, for power - the articulation of indi-
vidual/group power and the constitution of power hierarchies through speeches, 
for reward - to explicitly please the individual/group, and for risk - to exhibit the 
willingness to take risk for one’s goals.  
This serves to discern individual aspects and sets of discursive practices/ 
cognitive preferences of the scrutinized presidents as identity entrepreneurs to con-
textualize the EDA.  
This combination of methods as outlined in Table 1 reflects upon the 
manifold spatial and temporal avenues and interlinkages of markers and symbols of 
(ontological) insecurity and affective subjectivities (Solomon 2012, 2013) and the 
still experimental nature of exploring them.  
 
4. The Affective Memory Politics of the South Caucasus 2008-2018 
As outlined in the introduction, this article interrogates today’s contested 
mnemonic imaginaries in the presidential discourses of the South Caucasus on the 
occasion of the outlined three simultaneous biography-shaping events in 
2018/2019.  
The first part of the following analysis contextualises the contested nature 
of this triple anniversary’s remembrance by outlining the leaders’ affective disposi-
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tions through a leadership trait analysis with specific attention to the temporal focus 
of their presidential speech acts. As such, it is guided by the question of how the 
presidents represent their imaginaries stylistically in order to draw attention to their 
motivational cues and discursive temporalities. 
The second part of the following analysis traces the contested nature of 
this triple anniversary’s remembrance within the leaders’ affective storylines and 
mobilisations by interrogating the seven emblematic discursive categories relating to 
those anniversaries through an emotion discourse analysis.  
First, relating to the temporal character of anniversaries and the ontology 
of being 100 years after their independence from the Russian Empire and their 
formation as independent republics, it starts by asking ‘how is ‘the past’, or ’history’, 
conceived of and re-narrated - and how is ‘the state’, or ‘the sovereign’ imagined 
within this transitionary time?’.  
Second, relating to the ontology-unsettling change 30 years ago with the 
fall of the Berlin wall and the ‘end of the Cold War’ and thus the South Caucasus 
states’ independence from the SU but also the start of the secession wars around 
Nagorno-Karabakh, it interrogates the mnemonical re-construction of those times 
by looking at the discursive categories of ‘the Soviet Union’, ‘the break-up of the 
Soviet Union’, and ‘1989-1992’ as representations what is or is not remembered as 
ontologically instable timespan.  
Third, relating to the contextual foreign policy change for the South Cau-
casus states induced by the institutionalisation of the EU’s EaP as well as the 2008 
Russo-Georgian war 10 years ago and, at the half-way to today, the 2014 Ukraine 
Crisis, it inquires how both ‘2008/ Georgia’ and ‘2014/ Ukraine’ are remembered 
and refitted into present ontological discourses.  
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Fourth, relating to the adaptive nature of ontological security stability seek-
ing narratives and supporting emotional representations, it reflects upon the differ-
ent notions and meanings of ‘crises’ emerging from those preceding themes 
 
4.1. Leaders’ affective Dispositions: a Leadership Trait Analysis23 
The LTA as context for the following assemblage of narrative and affec-
tive landscapes has revealed distinct drive patterns within the discourses of the four 
presidents. Both the needs for affiliation and power rest on a high level for all 
presidents. The need for affiliation explicitly reflects the OS reverberations flowing 
through all those discourses as a baseline and represent the presidents’ coping and 
creativity in imagining relational identities. The high level of power drive present 
within those discourses reflects on the authoritarian tendencies of all those presi-
dents - or their imagination of how a consolidation of power within a limited elite 
serves their policies best. Interestingly, the drive to ‘achieve’ is constantly higher 
than the one for ‘reward’ - this could be interpreted as shallow populism where one 
rather showcases achievements as act of signal(ling) than to substantivise them in 
form of rewards towards the population/elite. Moreover, this reflects upon the 
exuberant narcissism - towards the individual self, the ruling elite and the ‘state’ as a 
national construct - shaping the discourses of Aliyev, Sargsyan and Saakashvili and 
only to a lesser extent that of Margvelashvili.  
In this regard, different motivational sets emerge within situations of crises 
and let us distinguish the quality of those. Around critical junctures, the willingness 
to signal ‘risk’ increases for all four presidents. However, cognitive OSS24 is differ-
ent after those junctures where either ‘affiliation’ or ‘power’ as motivational drives 
 
23 See Annex 1 for a graph and data overview. 
24 In contrast to affective OSS, cognitive OSS is concerned with the changes in cognitive reasoning 
to uphold a positive and constant self-image. As such, this is tightly related to Festinger's (1962) the-
ory of cognitive dissonance (Caverni et al. 1990; Sun 2006; Glöckner & Pachur 2012; Findlay & Tha-
gard 2014; Park et al. 2017; Gilmore & Rowling 2018). 
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peak. For example, the need for ‘affiliation’ increases after a crisis in Saakashvili’s 
case whereas ‘power’ emerges dominantly in Margvelashvili’s. Aliyev and Sargsyan 
both tend towards affiliation with a relatively high level of power underlying this. 
Interestingly, Sargsyan recently exhibits a tendency towards an increase in ‘power’ in 
addition to a heightened focus on achievements as a reaction towards critical junc-
tures. This lets us distinguish the quality of those crises in a sense that the affiliation 
drive rather speaks to identity recalibration crises whereas the power drive rather 
speaks to ruling system justification/legitimization crises25. 
What is more, all those discourses are caught in the present with more of a 
focus in the past than in the future. Not only does this reflect the confinement of 
those (identity) discourses in an everyday struggle of re-interpretation and contesta-
tion, but it highlights the potential for ‘the past’ to be drawn on and mobilized 
where the future is only a distant utopia.  
 
4.2. Leaders’ affective Storylines and Mobilisations: an Emotion Discourse Analysis26 
Affective OSS highlights that there are two underlying dynamics within 
what we understand as OSS. Upholding a positive self-understanding is split into 
two mutually constitutive but separate domains: one, the domain of narrative 
modulation strategies; two, the domain of affective re-calibrations. This work has 
argued that what we can observe as affective OSS is sustained and rejected through 
these intertwined collective identity dynamics. 
 
25 This is particularly obvious in Sargsyan’s case where one could identify his attempts to re-justify 
the ruling system through the increase in signalling achievements as an act of showcasing output-
legitimacy. Of course, it is difficult to discern identity crises from ruling system legitimization crises 
when looking at presidential discourses given that their (collective) identities overlap and a challenge 
to state ontics most often is intertwined with narratives about the legitimate rule within.  
26
 See Annex 2 for a data overview and coding illustrations. 
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What is striking in Sargsyan’s OS discourses is his engagement in memory 
politics in order to sustain Armenia’s OS. Particularly interesting is here that self-
victimisation is Sargsyan’s discursive strategy of choice. This could relate back to his 
construction of Armenia as (ontologically) superior where self-victimization is then 
a strong marker of frictions to those OS narratives.  
To pick and choose from the repertoire of moments in time in order to 
consolidate own OS narratives is a welcomed strategy by Aliyev. What becomes ob-
vious here are three themes along stressing own historic greatness and using narra-
tions of the past as justifications of current policies. Within these memory politics, 
first, the Azerbaijan-Nagorno-Karabakh togetherness is re-constructed by blocking 
any Armenian existence or experience there; second, Armenia/Turkey, Russia and 
the SU are remembered as the evil and the good respectively; and third, Aliyev’s 
general debate on and interpretation of history reveals intriguing insights into his 
understanding of Azerbaijan’s ontology and of global politics. Aliyev’s use of na-
tional memory is a stringent one: he only draws on memories supporting his vision 
of Azerbaijan’s OS narratives and blocks all accounts reciting otherwise. This 
blockage is absolute: there’s no defiance of those accounts in his discourse, but a 
complete absence insofar as these memories shall not even discursively exist.  
Saakashvili’s and Margvelashvili’s mnemonic discourses are different in 
referent object and qualities, but similar in discursive articulations. For both, falling 
back onto the past happens in the context of ontological crises such as 2008 and 
2014, where the temporal orientations of their speeches change relatively towards 
the past, decreasing both present and future orientations.  
The relative increase in the future and decrease in the past orientation at the 
end of Saakashvili’s tenure hint at two things: one, a relative conflict relief or less 
strained ontological security; two, ‘building a legacy’ through a positive future out-
look based on his achievements.  
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In turn, the increase in the temporal orientation towards the past around 
2014 could both represent a motivation and tendency to cope with the induced on-
tological insecurity through the Ukraine Crisis or as reflecting upon the achieve-
ments and failures of Margvelashvili’s predecessor.  
The contestation of and challenges to ontological security rationales have 
been traumatic for all three South Caucasus countries. Spread over seven emblem-
atic discursive categories relating to the discussed triple anniversary, the contesta-
tions of those identity signifiers highlight the makings and breakings of emotion 
communities as phenomenon of the dynamics of the affective geopolitics of the 
South Caucasus. Moreover, their contestation highlights the abundance of the 
rhetoric of memory politics embedded within affective OSS (Bernhard & Kubik 
2014; Gustafsson 2014; Resende & Budryte 2014; Mälksoo 2015, 2019; Nicolaïdis et 
al. 2015; Rumelili 2018; Subotić 2018, 2019; Donnelly & Steele 2019). 
 
History? 
History is imagined as source for offensive memory politics, as constant 
process of struggle and thus as source of pain and anger by all four presidents. 
Sargsyan imagines history as source of double agony - that is of genocide 
remembrance (1915/Ottoman Empire/Turkish genocide denial)27 and Azerbaijan’s 
 
27 ‘In his interview with Der Spiegel, speaking about the genocide which took place during World 
War I, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that ‘there can be no talk of genocide.’ 
Why cannot your neighboring country come to terms with its own past?  
- Mr. Erdogan once also said that the Turks couldn’t have possibly committed genocide and that 
Turkish history is “bright as the sun”. The Turks are opposed to the definition of the event as Gen-
ocide. But no matter how ferociously Turks oppose it, Ankara is not the one to decide on this issue. 
Now Erdogan is even threatening to expel thousands of Armenians, who reside in Turkey illegally. 
Unacceptable statements such as that one stir up in our nation the memories of the Genocide. Un-
fortunately, such statements articulated by the Turkish politicians come as no surprise to me. State-
ments like that one can be found in not so remote history – similar statements were voiced in Azer-
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fascism. As such, seeking OS translates into Sargsyan’s appeals to ‘redress the mis-
takes of the past’28 where ‘healing the past’ is a metaphor both for a reintegration of 
Artsakh into Armenia and for genocide recognition by Turkey. This is deeply em-
bedded within the mentioned self-victimization discourse. 
Aliyev and Saakashvili are united in their scepticism about Fukuyama’s end 
of history.  
‘History’29 is a volatile signifier in Aliyev’s discourses: it is both an interpre-
tation of a long tradition (of ontics) stretched over the - unconceivable - past and a 
pick-and-choose mechanism for specific instances favouring Aliyev’s OS narrative 
constructions. As such, the timelessness of national traditions and patriotism is 
deeply engrained in this understanding. Against this background, ‘the past’ is imag-
ined as something very positive, whereas ‘modern times’ are imagined as negative. 
This backwards-leaning tendency supports Aliyev’s critique of Western modernism 
as such and finds it utmost articulation in his outspoken scepticism about the iconic 
’End of History’ by Fukuyama. This scepticism about the ‘victory’ of liberal democ-
racy after the ‘defeat’ of the Soviet Union underlines two assumptions of Aliyev’s 
historicised world view: first, his fundamental critique of the Western liberal order 
 
baijan in 1988 and as a result dozens of Armenians became victims of the massacres conducted in 
Azerbaijani towns Sumgait and Baku.”’(Sargsyan, 05.04.2010). 
28 ‘It was not about getting the news because it was our calculated step. After the August putsch, 
Mutalibov was trying to tame the wave of nationalism which was becoming more extremist. On Au-
gust 30, 1991 Azerbaijan declared that Azerbaijani state of 1918-1920, which Nagorno-Karabakh had 
never been part of, was being reinstated. Under the circumstances we had to utilize our rights envis-
aged by the Constitution of the USSR and the Law on Secession from the Union. And we did: on 
September 2, the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence.’ (Sargsyan, 2.9.2011). 
29 ‘I think that we all had great illusions, of course. At the current stage of development there is an 
increasing awareness of the fact that there is no single model, as you say, liberal-democratic. It does 
not exist even in the countries that claim to be its authors. And the events unfolding in the euro 
zone and the crisis show that without government intervention and regulation it will be very difficult 
to achieve sustained growth. I believe that the blame for the financial crisis lies mainly on the irre-
sponsibility of politicians who, in fact, climbed into the pockets of future generations and could not 
possibly imagine, and perhaps even on the contrary, what consequences this will lead to.’ (Aliyev, 
14.04.2013). 
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and its unwanted intrusions, and second, his positive re-evaluation of the SU and 
attached governance principles30. This feeds into his ritual of shaming potential 
practices of ‘forgetting history’ - and thus the ‘consequences of fascism’ - as acts of 
securitising memory.  
Fascism as the most gruesome experience of the 20th century is being 
brought up repeatedly in this context to construct Armenia as perpetrator of it, as 
historically evil other. This lesson from the past is part of the standard repertoire 
being mobilised around Armenia, together with the counter-narrative of Azeri love 
for Nagorno-Karabakh. ‘Forgetting’ history - and the lessons learned, e.g. what Ali-
yev narrates as Armenian fascism - is a cautious warning frame in Aliyev’s interpre-
tation of national memory. This becomes clear when Aliyev expresses worry about 
attempts to rewrite history31 - intentionally leaving what he means by that relatively 
open - in order to harm Azerbaijan and Russia32.  
 
30 ‘It was only revitalized with the ascent of President Heydar Aliyev to power in 1993, when Victory 
Day was declared a public holiday. It is a day off now. Thus historical justice has been restored. We 
have a very good attitude to our veterans. I must say that this year we will complete the program on 
the provision of all our veterans with cars. We also regularly allocate apartments, areas for recreation 
and cash rewards to them. They are the pride of our people, and we honor the memory of those 
killed. And we are convinced that the young generation should be brought up on the example of the 
selfless heroism and love of the homeland, so that the tradition of heroism and love of the 
Fatherland continues. Also, as you have pointed out, this is a historic moment that brings all nations 
of the former Soviet Union together. In principle, it should bring together all those who contributed 
to the victory over fascism.‘ (Aliyev, 29.04.2015). 
31 ‘We are very concerned about these attempts – first, to rewrite history and belittle the role of the 
Soviet army in the victory over fascism, as well as the attempts we are seeing in terms of the 
glorification of Nazi criminals, their followers and those who share their ideology. It probably 
seemed to us all some time ago that fascism was completely over with and that this evil mankind had 
not seen in its history is gone forever. Unfortunately, after some time, as a result of the efforts of 
certain circles and a propaganda campaign, we can see that a part of the younger generation around 
the world does not know the actual history. Constantly inculcated with distorted historical facts, they 
somewhat become susceptible to this virus. We see marches, torch processions and demonstrations 
of neo-fascists in many regions around the world. All this is of great concern. 
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This securitisation continues along the just outlined motives of critiquing 
the Western governance model(s) as inapt, as a challenge to regional and global sta-
bility. In so doing, his appeal to ‘learn from history’ in order to not ever be not sov-
ereign anymore could be read as implicit threat and critical engagement with post-
Cold War intellectual thought. 
For both Saakashvili and Margvelashvili, history is legitimising source of 
Georgia’s Europeanness and constant reminder of Russian offensive behaviour 
against Georgia. Where Saakashvili joins Aliyev in his pessimistic revaluation of Fu-
kuyama’s theory, he extends this to a more securitised vision of the present and fu-
ture where there was not only no end of history in sight but that tragedies were al-
ways possible. This highlights Saakashvili’s understanding of history as potentially 
repeating, as constant precarious struggle of seeking ontological security33. In this 
regard, Margvelashvili is in accord with Saakashvili’s historical cataclysms as hurdles 
to OS which are a recurring theme within his narrated ontological insecurities.  
 
We cherish our history and the heroism of all the peoples of the Soviet Union and other allied 
countries which put an end to this nightmare. It must live in the memory of generations. So I think 
that it is now the responsibility of politicians, the leaders of countries and influential public figures 
who revere the great feat of our fathers and grandfathers. […] I think that at this stage all public 
entities sharing the convictions I am talking about should coordinate their actions, should work hard 
in terms of informing the public, especially the younger people, about the historical truth and coun-
ter the glorification of fascism and the rewriting of history‘ (Aliyev, 29.04.2015) 
32 As such, the just described methods are applied by him to both reject the narrations of the past 
not in line with his interpretation, as well as to stabilise, defend and seal his vision of a consolidated 
past.  
33 ‘I am speaking at the UN and I think the main thing is that it's 20 years after the demise of the 
Soviet Union which Zbigniew Brzezinsky had lots of things to do with. He predicted it when no-
body ever believed it. He didn't predict the exact date but he predicted it correctly. And then it's of 
course the anniversary of 9/11 and every time pundits were wrong. Both times they said history is 
finished, that it's all over. You know, history is certainly not finished and things can get very tragic. 
And certainly we will consider these things. On one hand there is this thing of anniversaries. I mean 
things have gone reverse after that. You know Russia has become more revisionists - trying to re-
store some sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union. Terrorists have gone on attacks. But on 
the other hand the good news is that there is the Arab spring there is a wave of democratization. But 
it can go both ways among what was the former Soviet Empire.’ (Saakashvili, 26.07.2011) 
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The Soviet Union?  
The Soviet Union is imagined on a nostalgia scale from exuberant to non-
existent.  
Both Armenia and Azerbaijan state a discontinuity between ‘the Soviet’ 
and ‘Russia’, but instead argue in favour of identity continuity through nostalgia for 
the good old times. 
In Armenia Soviet Union nostalgia is excessively displayed, where it is re-
membered as experience of glorious peace.  
In Azerbaijan, Soviet Union nostalgia prevails as well where the SU’s posi-
tive cultural impact and the fact that Nagorno-Karabakh was designated under Az-
eri authority are cherished. Particularly the Azeri past of Nagorno-Karabakh in So-
viet times is repeatedly mobilized, singularized and contextualised with the Helsinki 
Final Act, in which Nagorno-Karabakh ‘was promised to Azerbaijan’ to treasure 
this specific narration of the past in favour of Azeri ontics. However, this is joined 
by trauma of the break-up chaos leading to a negation of those ontics.  
In Georgia, there’s no nostalgia present, but trauma based on the remem-
brance of gruel Soviet occupation and domination where both presidents see conti-
nuity between ‘the Soviet’ and ‘the Russian’ as harmful reality34. Where Saakashvili 
imagines the Soviet Union through its totalitarianism as opposite to his ideal of a 
 
34 ‘If I think about our Soviet past, I remember the emotions that Georgians had when they came 
here; the emotion that they were visiting a nation that has the same attitude towards unacceptance of 
Soviet occupation and Soviet rule of life. Of course, there could not be much political connections at 
that time, but the emotion that we cannot accept being forced out of our statehood and forced into 
this union was uniting at that time. Of course, after that we found each other, embraced each other 
and now I can say that our cooperation and our support to each other is extremely important. Geor-
gians are so thankful to you because your government, your president, your people support us so 
much on our way to European and Euro-Atlantic community. You are the ones that are talking in 
the name of values of freedom and statehood. You are not talking only for yourself, but also for 
countries like Georgia. I would like to thank every Lithuanian for doing this.’ (Margvelashvili, 
28.02.2018) 
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modern state, Margvelashvili underlines the trauma of Soviet dominance and occu-
pation ever since as fundamental ontological insecurity struggle.  
 
Break-up of the Soviet Union? 
The SU’s break-up is imagined according to its outlined antithetic revalua-
tions. 
Sargsyan portrays the break-up as painful, chaotic tragedy. 
Aliyev draws on the trauma of the break-up chaos as founding myth of the 
new Azerbaijan under Heydar Aliyev who mastered successfully the ensuing insecu-
rities.  
Both Saakashvili and Margvelashvili represent the break-up as traumatic 
pain but emphasise the contrasting joy and happiness of ensuing freedoms and sov-
ereignty. The metaphor of falling walls is employed here to mobilise positive emo-
tions around hope and unity since the SU’s break-up to represent the obsolescence 
of old structures to be replaced by new, efficient ones. In contrast to Saakashvili, 
however, Margvelashvili approaches what he frames as democratic consolidation 
through a less neoliberal lens, articulating the concerns of people over being left be-
hind and not benefitting enough where living conditions are still difficult. It is 
within this context that Margvelashvili implies Georgia’s fears of a new Cold War, 
but asserts that in reality this is already a given.  
 
1989-1992?  
‘1989-1992’ is imagined as tumultuous time of transformation, re-
orientation and seeking and acquiring ontological security during and after the 
break-up of the Soviet Union.  
In Armenia, these years are imagined as years of struggle and purification 
of the nation marked by Azeri inimicality.  
Susanne Szkola, Trauma or Nostalgia? ‘The Past’ as Affective Ontological Security Seeking Playground in 
the South Caucasus 
 
 
 
 
79 
 
 
 
 
In Azerbaijan, these years are signifiers of a triple ontological crisis (exis-
tence, military power and authority over Nagorno-Karabakh, spiritual re-
orientation) and feed into the funding myth of glorious leadership under the Aliyev 
family.  
In Saakashvili’s Georgia, these years are portrayed as a quest for purifica-
tion, modernisation and liberation from the Soviet Union.  
In Margvelashvili’s Georgia, 1989-1992 is re-imagined as actual start of the 
Russian occupation and attempted annexation of Georgia. In this regard, 
Margvelashvili asserts that ‘historical justice’ was always on Georgia’s side against 
Russia and that the ongoing occupation since 1990 - not 2008 - was to stop. More-
over, all ensuing bad experiences and developments of Georgia are linked to this 
period in time and justified through Russian malevolent behaviour since then.  
 
2008/Georgia?  
‘2008 and Georgia’ is as disputed as the imaginaries of the Soviet Union 
and its break-up between the four presidents.  
Sargsyan’s imaginaries showcase an intensive mixture of affective positiv-
ity/negativity. 2008 is signifier of a double crisis, but also signifier of a double re-
laxation. In this context, 2008 feeds into an imaginary of Armenia as a suffering vic-
tim (through the 5 Days War in Georgia and perceived EU/NATO advancements 
in the neighbourhood having led to this confrontation) and of Armenia as optimist 
and hopeful agenda setter for conflict resolutions (in Artsakh and normalization ef-
forts with Turkey). 
Aliyev’s interpretation of 2008 is one of Western normative imposition 
where Georgia’s Western orientation has led to critical instability in the neighbour-
hood.  
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Saakashvili sees 2008 as articulation of the cynical revisionist realpolitik by 
Russia which pursues ambitions of hegemonic reign like the SU. In this regard, 
2008 is portrayed as ‘verge of life and death’ of the Georgian nation, as all-
fractioning ontological insecurity35. However, it is also remembered through Geor-
gian resolve and Western support as counter-vision to what is labelled experience of 
existential angst. This existential angst of 2008 signifies a securitised ontological in-
security imaginary where Saakashvili posits ‘another 2008’ as ever-so-possible.  
Margvelashvili draws on Saakashvili’s representations of 2008 and repre-
sents 2008 as the critical wound at the origin of Georgian suffering: ‘the Russian 
trauma’. Interestingly, he requalifies 2008 also as critical juncture not only for Geor-
gia’s OS but for relations with Russia which are portrayed as strong bond before-
hand. This requalification of 2008 is also visible when he pessimistically identifies 
2008 as pre-set for 2014 and the beginning of the multiple failures of the West.  
Here, the trope of unity, sovereignty and stability draws on this asserted 
new Cold War reality to emphasise the importance of those qualities for Georgia’s 
(ontological) security. Margvelashvili depicts unity as the only, ultimate truth and 
links this to his discourse of sovereign choices to rally the domestic around the flag 
against international challenge(r)s. Moreover, he bridges this with the appeal to con-
solidate Georgia’s European democracy as expression of this ontology and mecha-
 
35
 ‘- In Ukraine, everybody knows about your friendship with the former Ukrainian President -Viktor 
Yushchenko. When was the last time you met him? 
- Last time - a couple of days ago in Krynica, during the Economic Forum. I shook the hand of 
Viktor Andreevich. Of course, we have a good relationship! As you know, he came to Georgia dur-
ing the 2008 Georgia-Russia conflict over South Ossetia. Our country needed support the most back 
then. After all, we were on the verge of life and death. An army of about 100 thousand soldiers came 
close to our capital, but we did not have enough weapons and soldiers to defend ourselves! And our 
main weapons were not the troops. The fact that thousands of people came out into the streets of 
Tbilisi and our friends arrived - five leaders of the former Soviet Union (as well as president of 
France) held hands near the Parliament... In short, the main thing was not the fact that Viktor 
Yushchenko was in Tbilisi at a difficult moment, but the fact that he represented Ukraine in Georgia 
at that time. Our country will remember it forever.’ (Saakashvili, 15.9.2011). 
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nism to find unity (preferences). In this regard, Margvelashvili narrates Georgia as 
having overcome the inner turmoil of the past to find this consensus. 
Remembering 2008 as a critical wound which has to be healed feeds into 
these dichotomous memory politics of before-and-after-2008: hopeful narratives 
about Georgia as peaceful and tranquil country support a vision that is was some-
how possible to go back to the better past before-2008 if Russia was as tranquil as 
Georgia.  
 
2014/Ukraine? 
‘2014 and Ukraine’ is imagined in surprising unison with regards to its na-
ture as critical juncture in and for the neighbourhood with regards to the ensuing 
security fragility. In contrast, it is imagined in complete oppositional terms with re-
gards to its assumed reasons for onset and consequences.  
Armenia and Azerbaijan agree that the Ukraine Crisis is a consequence of 
Western hegemonic norm imposition.  
Armenia depicts 2014 as a painful critical juncture which has made clear 
the East-West divide and the EU’s drive for normative hegemony in the 
neighbourhood. In this regard, Ukraine is characterized as defiant other. In contrast, 
satisfaction with EEU accession talks is voiced as an alternative.  
Azerbaijan’s temporal othering of a favoured Ukraine under Yanukovych 
pre-2014 and a disfavoured Ukraine post-2014 underlines its evaluation of the 
Ukraine Crisis as violently fragmenting the neighbourhood.  
In contrast to Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia identifies Russia’s annexa-
tion of Crimea as an act undermining and violating liberal norms and global order.  
Georgia’s Saakashvili, albeit not in power anymore at this point in time, 
construed Ukraine as ontologically similar to Georgia during his tenure. Moreover, 
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he saw Georgia as a role model for Ukraine and empathetically and fearfully pro-
jects the possibility of historic tragedies towards Ukraine.  
Georgia’s Margvelashvili initially articulates discourses of hope and opti-
mism in an amelioration of relations with Russia is in parallel to - and later gilded by 
- discourses of contempt and resentment. These are, falling back into line with Sa-
akashvili’s rationales, guided by an understanding of Russia as complete ontological 
opposite of Georgia from which different understandings of all essential political 
principles are derived.  
This change happens with the Ukraine Crisis which is immediately under-
stood as synonymous to the events and situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
Thus, the identification of Ukraine as experiencing the same ontological insecurity 
as Georgia instigated by the very same challenger lets those hopeful discourses col-
lapse into pessimistic visions where perceived similarity with Ukraine (and 
Moldova) foster Margvelashvili’s new narrations of Georgia as best in being able to 
understand, analyse, question and critique Russian (foreign) policies and propa-
ganda.  
2014 as critical juncture thus re-intensifies the uncertainty and insecurity of 
Margvelashvili’s OS narratives in relation to Russia, where he reverts to securitised 
arguments that meetings with Russia were only possible if they met on Georgia’s 
ontological self-definition terms36.  
 
36 ‘I think, in 2008, there was no understanding of the essence of the policy pursued by Russia in 
the international arena. At that time, there were attempts to ’explain’ somehow Moscow’s absurd ac-
tions on locating troops into Georgia. We all have paid a fee for the fact that neither then, nor now, 
no strong and firm response is given to the Russian policy. After all, it is a fact that Russia has de-
clared clearly and unambiguously: what is in the Russian slang called the ‚near abroad‘, in fact is a 
‘zone of privileged interests of the Russian Federation’. Apparently, it is meant that international law 
quasi does not apply to these states, these ’territories’. But, even if it does, so only in some strange, 
distorted format, in which international rules are formally in force, still, the final word goes to Russia 
and the Russian weaponry. This kind of attitude is fraught with problems not only in Russia’s rela-
tions with its neighbors. If we ‘develop’ such ‘logic’ on a global scale, we get destabilization not only 
on the border with Russia, but in any region of the world, where there is a strong state with nuclear 
Susanne Szkola, Trauma or Nostalgia? ‘The Past’ as Affective Ontological Security Seeking Playground in 
the South Caucasus 
 
 
 
 
83 
 
 
 
 
The metaphorical equation of 2008 and 2014 as similar critical junctures 
thus securitises and politicises Russia’s OS contestations in the neighbourhood. It 
casts and shames Russia as challenging and re-drawing (b)orders and creating artifi-
cial states in the neighbourhood. ‘Artificial’ describes the different understandings 
of ontologies between Russia and the states experiencing its occupation - where 
Russia’s reading is framed as unfitting with the existing ontics, thus as creating fric-
tions in these OS narrative webs.  
This metaphor is emotionally and morally charged and draws on 
Margvelashvili’s memory politics: it includes narrations of the historical injustice of 
Russia’s OS contestations - framed as genocides - and seeks to dispose of them 
through assuming that the very historical justice will be on Ukraine’s and Georgia’s 
side eventually, which is represented through pain, anger, hate, and disgust but also 
anxiety, regret and remorse about the current insecurities.  
Moreover, this metaphor draws in - voicing disappointment - the failures 
of the West as preset for and continuity of these critical junctures and in so doing 
casts Ukraine and Georgia - but also all other EaP countries which are perceived as 
potentially having to experience Russian meddling - as a different emotion commu-
nity. This emotion community is one of empathetic understanding of the pain and 
 
capability and a theoretical possibility of treating its weaker neighbors in the same way, as Russia 
treats its neighbors. Unfortunately, the West failed to comprehend the absurdity and tragedy of what 
happened in 2008. As a result, in 2014 we got the ‘Ukrainian Front’; and Russia, having the ‘experi-
ence of 2008’, was much more organized and rapid, because the Russian leadership considered the 
aggressive style of action acceptable. I think that today the West’s fidelity to principles should be 
based exactly on this bitter experience. When I communicate with colleagues in the West, I always 
tell them: ‚the point is to be very honest with Russians and tell them directly: this is unacceptable to 
us!‘; and also, confirm that the West considers Georgia, Ukraine and other Russian neighbors, as 
equal and sovereign subjects of international law. This is the ‚mere truth‘ of international relations. 
This is to say that it is necessary to speak clearly with Russia. I think, the peaceful future can only be 
achieved through these relations for Russia, as well as for Georgia and other states.“ (Margvelashvili, 
3.10.2016) 
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sufferance attached to these ontological anxieties and a mirroring of the extensive 
feelings of hate and disgust towards Russia, and therefore in contrast to what is 
construed as more restrained emotional reactions of the West.  
Crises?  
Crises are imagined completely differently based on the abundance of just 
outlined affective imaginaries (of the past).  
For Armenia, regionally exclusive structures imposed by the EU/NATO, 
Artsakh/Azerbaijan, the domestic opposition, Turkey’s genocide denial, and the SU 
break-up are imagined as crises limiting the ability to go on and feel as before. 
Moreover, Sargsyan denounces the lecturing of smaller states by bigger ones as cri-
ses of status and prestige. Interestingly, a securitised looming global crisis is not 
only seen as threat, but also as opportunity for new security structures - excluding 
and being directed against Azerbaijan.  
For Azerbaijan, crises are identified in an Azeri ontological crisis on its 
own, the question of Nagorno-Karabakh, the opposition contesting domestic le-
gitimacy, the global economic crisis and local reverberations, ‘the West’ - and par-
ticularly the EP - critiquing Azerbaijan as well as the inaptness of Western govern-
ance models as challenge to regional and global security. As such, Aliyev engages 
highly critically in a deconstruction of post-Cold War modernist intellectual 
thought.  
For Georgia, crisis signifiers change between the two presidents under 
scrutiny for this timeframe. Saakashvili identifies the dialectical, entangled relation-
ship between Georgian and Russian ontologies as linchpin to all further security 
imaginaries. As such, strained ontics as repeated, ever-so-present threats to the sur-
vival of the self by Russia dominate his discourses. Moreover, he posits reverbera-
tions to global order given the imminent Russian collapse as upcoming crisis of a 
global power vacuum. In this regard, he supposes that if the US would be 
weak(ened), subsequently the EU, as implicit ally/vassal of the US, would be 
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weak(ened) too - leading to the instability of global order. Furthermore, relating to 
the EU and NATO, feelings of rejection and neglect invoked by those ontological 
anchors are portrayed as crisis of trust, similar to what he identifies as internal crises 
of the EU, namely lagging reforms and integration fatigue. Margvelashvili builds 
upon but also adapts Saakashvili’s crises imaginaries. He identifies Russia as all-
encompassing threat by expatiating on its aggression/occupation, its wrongful near 
abroad conceptions, its construction of NATO myths, and its EU undermining. 
Furthermore, he identifies crises in concentric OS circles: the domestic (Russian 
sympathies), Russia (where South Ossetia and Abkhazia are linking back to the do-
mestic), Ukraine (as empathetic critical juncture), and a broad category of the inter-
national (liberal order’s credibility and efficiency, EU/NATO’s fatigue/rejections). 
 
5. Reflections 
‘Cultural issues of identity and history have also been integral to the ascent 
and consolidation of populism in post-communist East Europe. The fact that East 
European trauma under communism is not adequately understood and appreciated 
in the West is the central grievance of these movements, and this feeds into new cy-
cles of victimization – this time the perceived oppression focuses on Western liberal 
ideals, such as ‘gender ideology’, feminism, LGBTQ rights, or even more dramati-
cally, Middle Eastern migration and refugee flows. The core of populist resentment 
is the issue of cultural imposition – and the deepest cultural imposition post-
communist Europe feels today is the imposition of the Western memory on their 
own pasts.’ (Subotic 2019b:1) 
What this article has laid out is an understanding of these affective geo-
politics - marked in the above quote by ‘trauma’, ‘grievance’, ‘victimization’, or ‘re-
sentment’ as emotional representations of what is construed as imposition of West-
ern memory - through readings of OS theory to substantiate what Toal (2018) calls 
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‘shock events’ as critical junctures interpreted as affective ontological insecurities, 
and to shed light onto constructions of ‘the past’ through the dynamics of emotion 
communities within the logics of affective ontological security seeking. This has 
highlighted the central role of affective markers of ontological insecurities in dis-
courses and how this has affected change and continuity in renegotiating remem-
brance by the presidents of the South Caucasus states. In so doing, it has drawn 
particular attention to the affective reproduction of memory and has shown how 
investing, subscribing, questioning or rejecting identity-positionalities is a patchwork 
process of discursive emotion norm contestations resulting in traumatic or nostalgic 
representations of the past.  
Here, an analysis of what Toal (2018) called the ‘leaders’ affective disposi-
tions’ of the four presidential discourses from 2008-2018 through a LTA showed 
the different discursive approaches to identity politics in general. An analysis of 
what he called ‘affective storylines’ and ‘state-sponsored mobilizations’ through an 
EDA showed the multiplicity of specific affective landscapes and discursive prac-
tices to create emotional representations within affective OSS logics.  
Spread over seven emblematic discursive categories relating to the dis-
cussed triple anniversaries, the contestations of those identity signifiers highlight the 
makings and breakings of emotion communities as phenomenon of the dynamics of 
the affective geopolitics of the South Caucasus. Moreover, their contestation high-
lights the abundance of the rhetoric of memory politics embedded within affective 
OSS. 
‘Defending memory’ as seeking ontological security is then achieved 
through articulating opposite emotions towards the same events: to redraw what is 
perceived as appropriate feeling (rule) towards the past. As such, trauma and nostal-
gia are affective re-interpretations of those insecurities as well as affective canvases 
to justify present and future politics. Affective investments as emotional commit-
ments to those re-interpretations vary in their salience and valence. The dissected 
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presidential discourses highlight the repertoire within affective storylines to imagine 
a canvas (emotional representations) and paint on it (emotionalisations) to (re-)seek 
ontological security.  
There, the affective difference between politicisation and securitisation 
gets qualified: discursive moves of politicization exploit the salience of (pre-existing) 
affective investments, discursive moves of securitization change the valence of (pre-
existing) affective investments.  
Particularly, the presidential discourses show another dimension of ‘how 
the nation continues to operate as a salient register’ (Antonsich et al. 2020), namely 
through its affective re-appraisal as ontological anchor. 
What this work has furthermore shown is that these dynamics are to be 
understood as way more than scaremongering and blaming, or hate and love, but as 
amalgamation of a situated variety of emotions and emotionalisations (Hor 2019).  
Particularly the role of pain and suffering - and subsequent anger - as additional 
markers of ontological insecurities and critical junctures as well as the delineation of 
a vast bi-valent variety of emotionalisations within affective OSS adds to the litera-
ture which has mostly zoomed in onto anxiety and fear as emotional representations 
of these insecurities as well as blaming and shaming as emotionalisations.  
These findings also speak to what Giddens called ‘colonisation of the fu-
ture’: the practice of system justification and political ordering. In turn, this often 
overlooked aspect of Giddens’s work is related to ‘risk reduction’ (that is, minimis-
ing the vulnerability to critical OS junctures) and memory politics: ‘People in all cul-
tures, including the most resolutely traditional, distinguish future, present and past, 
and weigh alternative courses of action in terms of likely future considerations. But 
as we saw in the previous chapter, where traditional modes of practice are domi-
nant, the past inserts a wide band of ‘authenticated practice’ into the future. Time is 
not empty, and a consistent ‘mode of being’ relates future to past. In addition, tradi-
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tion creates a sense of the firmness of things that typically mixes cognitive and 
moral elements. The world is as it is because it is as it should be.’ (Giddens 1991: 
48, 133f). 
As the above quote highlights, these struggles about the power of (affec-
tive) interpretation do not only take place within the South Caucasus countries, but 
are part and parcel of broader international contestations. These contestations not 
only encompass identity-positionalities, but attached emotion norms and adjoint 
emotion communities. The latter communities drift not only apart (between the 
South Caucasus countries), but also away (different anchors/poles of perceived ap-
propriate emotion norms internationally, e.g. here either the EU or Russia). In this 
regard, those emotion communities are imagined OS communities bound by empa-
thy and sympathy - to care for the self/other - or by the complete opposite of it - to 
deny the self/other those emotions when interpreting not only the past.  
As such, discussions about a potential revival of Cold War imaginaries 
should not be limited to tracing narratives, but should pay attention to the widening 
divergence in emotion (norms) attached to those re-interpretations (Creutziger & 
Reuber 2019). 
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Annex 1: Leaders’ affective Dispositions and temporal Focus in 
Discourse in the South Caucasus 2008-2018 
 
Armenia 
 
Figure 1: Sargsyan's individual Traits and Predispositions: Drives in Discourse 2008-2018 (ACLA) 
 
Source: own elaboration.  
 
Figure 2: Sargsyan's individual Traits and Predispositions: Temporal Focus of Discourse 2008-2018 
(ACLA) 
 
Source: own elaboration.  
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Azerbaijan 
 
Figure 3: Aliyev's individual Traits and Predispositions: Drives in Discourse 2008-2018 (ACLA) 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
Figure 4: Aliyev's individual Traits and Predispositions: Temporal Focus of Discourse 2008-2018 
(ACLA)  
 
Source: own elaboration. 
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Georgia  
(Saakashvili 2008-2013, Margvelashvili 2013-2018) 
Figure 5: Saakashvili's and Margvelashvili’s individual Traits and Predispositions: Drives in Discourse 
2008-2018 (ACLA) 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
Figure 6: Saakashvili's and Margvelashvili’s individual Traits and Predispositions: Temporal Focus of 
Discourse 2008-2018 (ACLA) 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
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Annex 2: Corpus Overview and Illustrations 
a. Code Sets Overview 
Table 1: Code Sets Overview for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (Saakashvili and Margvelashvili), 
2008-2018.  
Georgia 
Code Set Azerbaijan Armenia Margvelashvili Saakashvili 
Ukraine 14 4 87 15 
Crimea / / 29 / 
CSTO / 16 / / 
CIS 9 7 / / 
EEU / 36 2 / 
CU 2 14 / / 
Soviet 7 5 5 3 
China 3 7 20 / 
Iran 9 36 3 / 
2008 / 36 31 8 
West 6 5 27 1 
US 2 14 23 9 
EaP, ENP, DCFTA, 
AA / 19 18 4 
NATO / 8 50 4 
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Neighbourhood 7 5 14 14 
East-West 5 5 3 / 
Kosovo 1 3 1 / 
Turkey 44 86 16 3 
ontology 96 91 86 38 
other-ing 8 24 5 17 
enemy 6 5 1 14 
friend/ally 20 22 26 5 
threat 31 40 23 10 
security 27 38 9 2 
crisis 12 18 14 2 
foreign policy 37 7 36 5 
sovereignty/self-
determination 3 11 12 1 
conflict 8 12 11 / 
past, history, mem-
ory, tradition, always 37 84 62 20 
Nagorno-Karabakh 150 111 8 / 
South Ossetia, 
Abkhazia / 5 151 21 
domestic policy is-
sues, domestic 
groups 325 109 126 67 
emotions and emo-
tionalizations 360 296 165 65 
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EU topics 25 48 127 6 
Russia topics 76 60 219 47 
Russia as … 12 15 26 19 
genocide: 
51 
Armenia 
as…:172 
Azerbaijan 
as … :143 
Codings: 2653 
in sets: 4781 
Note: ‘/’ means ‘no codings’ for these categories for the respective country 
Source: own sample (see page 16 in this article) 
b. Data Exploration and Interpretation: Example of Inductive Coding
Context of the interview:  
A correspondent of Radio Liberty met with Georgian President Giorgi 
Margvelashvili to discuss the future of the country’s foreign policy and its relations 
with Russia, Ukraine and the West. The conversation took place after 
Margvelashvili’s meeting with Pope Francis on October 3rd, 2016. 
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